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LIABILITY OF MASTER FOR EMPLOYING SERVANT UNABLE TO
COMPREHEND THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in the case of Beers v.
Prouty & Co., 85 N. E. 864, rendered a very practical decision on
the doctrine of master and servant, which will be of particular
importance to manufacturers and insurance companies. In that
case, the plaintiff was engaged as a feeder of a machine for mak-
ing pasteboard, which two men were required to operate, while
his assistant, called the "catcher," was charged with the duty of
turning off and on the power for starting or stopping the machine.
While the plaintiff was cleaning this machine, his fingers became
caught, and he called to the catcher to shut off the power. The
catcher, being unable to comprehend English, turned on the
power, and the fingers of the plaintiff were severed. The court
held that the sending of a catcher incapacitated in that manner,
when it was necessary for him to receive directions by word of
mouth in that language, was sufficient evidence of the employ-
ment of an incompetent servant to render the employer liable.
This question, as to the liability of the employer for sending a
man, who could not comprehend English, or the language of the
man in charge of the machine, in a case of this kind, has but
seldom arisen and must be conceded to have been properly de-
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cided. It has been recognized for many years that the plaintiff
in such a case must not only show the incompetency, but also that
the defendant failed to exercise proper care and diligence to
ascertain the qualifications and competency of the servant prior
to his appointment. Wabash R. R. v. McDaniel, io7 U. S.
454 (1882) ; Tarrant v. Webb, i8 C. B., 797 (1856). The degree
of care to be exercised by the employer in engaging employees
must be commensurate with the nature and dangers of the work,
the position for which the servant is intended, and the hazards to
which the other servants are to be exposed from the employment
of a careless and incompetent person, this degree, being measured
by the care which a reasonably prudent man would exercise in
the same business or undertaking. Wood on Master and Servant,
Sect. 418, p. 799. This is not confined to the knowledge of any-
one accomplishment, such as the working of the machinery in
this case, but it must be extended so that the employer may ascer-
tain the ignorance of the applicant on all subjects which are
essential to the performance of the required duty. Thus the
inability to comprehend English, where co-operation with other
employees is not necessary, as in manual labor, would not render
the servant incompetent, and employees speaking divers tongues
could be engaged to work together, whereas in the case recently
decided, where co-operation was necessary, this inability was
fatal. This idea may even be applied to work of a higher char-
acter, for as the court aptly says: "Ignorance of the English
language in an experimental chemist working by himself for a
steel manufacturer might not render him incompetent, but it
could not be contended that one unfamiliar with that language
would make a suitable teacher for the public schools." Beers v.
Prouty & Co., supra. When a servant lacking these qualifica-
tions is thus employed, and his co-worker is injured, the employer
should be, and is liable, for the servant has a right to rely on the
assumption that the master will perform his duty by appointing
competent servants.
Among the various mental qualities which affect the com-
petency of servants probably one of the most important is ner-
vousness. This and lack of judgment on the part of a stationary
engineer, Olsen v. Andrew's, 168 Mass. 261, and weakness, in-
firmity and excitability in an elevator man, Ledswidge v. Hath-
away, 170 Mass. 348, have been held to render them incompetent;
but the mere fact that an employee because of nervousness is
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more than ordinarily careful in the performance of the work to
which he is assigned is no evidence of his incompetency, Bruce
v. Penn. Bridge Co., 197 Pa. 439 (19oo). Accidents resulting
from the mere temporary excitement and nervousness of the em-
ployee, such as, where an employee, in the excitement of fire,
forgot to shift a belt before stopping a machine, thus causing a
co-employee injury, when the machine was again started, have
been held not to render the employer liable, as there was nothing
to show that the employee was not mentally fit for his position.
Gilnore v. Mittineague Paper Co., 169 Mass. 471. The case of
Burke v. Syracuse, Boston & New York R. R., 69 Hun. 21
(893), in which a robust boy of seventeen, who had successfully
operated a telegraph station and single track siding for two and
one-half months, was one day seized with the thought that the
switch was wrong, and rushing out to change it to prevent a
catastrophe, switched the train on a side track and caused a col-
lision, illustrates the same principle, for the court held that the
employer was not liable. It would seem that incapacity under
this head must be of an exceptional nature to justify the in-
ference of negligence on the part of the master, for it is generally
impossible to perceive such inefficiency by merely using reason-
able care.
Developing this line of incapacity because of inferior mental
qualities from nervousness and excitement to the stage of lack
of education, we find a rather different situation, for in these
cases we may consider the physical and nervous systems of the
servant satisfactory, but attribute the incompetency to the lack
of proper education for the assigned position. Probably the best
illustration of this is the case of Taylor v. Western Pacific R. R.,
645 Cal. 323 (1873), in which a railroad company, whose road
formed a junction with another road, entrusted a person em-
ployed by the other company to attend to their trains at this
point. He was given the time-tables of both roads so he could be
informed regarding the arrival and departure of trains. But,
owing to his inability to read the time-tables, he became confused
and a collision occurred which killed the fireman. In an action
by his family to recover, the court held that it undoubtedly would
be gross negligence for the defendant to knowingly place the
attendant at this position without ascertaining whether he was
able to read, but that it was a question for the jury, for the de-
fendant may have taken all reasonable precautions and still have
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been deceived by the fraudulent practices of the attendant or
others.
These principles can readily be applied to the case under dis-
cussion, for just as the ability to read the time-table was a most
important element in ascertaining the competency of the switch-
man; so was the ability to comprehend English an essential
qualification for the catcher, for by lacking this knowledge, he
could not obey his orders and as a result, the accident occurred.
Probably the case most analogous to this one is Lantry & Sons v.
Lowrie, decided by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in I9oo;
58 S. W. 837. It was there held that the liability for an injury
occasioned by the employment of a co-laborer of a low order of
intellect, and one who could not understand the English language,
in a position in which the co-operation of the laborers was neces-
sary, where the evidence was conflicting as to whether the injury
was due to ignorance or carelessness, was a question which should
be submitted to the jury.
Thus, both by weight of authority and good reasoning, the
court seems to be justified in rendering this decision, and although
it may cause employers to be more diligent in selecting men
who will be competent for their positions, nevertheless, it seems
to be only a logical deduction from the previous decisions on this
doctrine, which must develop as labor and capital become more
diversified.
LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE CORPORATION FOR TORTS OF ITS AGENTS.
Within a few months the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of New York was called upon to decide the question as to
whether a charitable corporation is liable to answer in damages
for torts committed by its agents. The particular delict in the case
of Kellogg v. Church Charities Foundation of Long Island, con-
sisted in negligence on the part of the defendant's servant. The
trial court dismissed the complaint at close of evidence, and the
Appellate Division reversed this in a lengthy, elucidative and
logical opinion reported in 112 N. Y. Supp. 566.
The cases of actions against public eleemosynary corporations
of this sort are usually divided into two classes, first, suits arising
by reason of negligence on the part of physicians doing work
gratuitously for the institution, and second, those arising through
negligence of its servants properly speaking. The reasoning of
the line of demarcation is somewhat vague and illogical, but such
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as it is, such a distinction is clearly drawn in the principal case.
And in this case the Appellate Division permitted the plaintiff to
recover, notwithstanding that such recovery might result in the
depletion of trust funds in satisfying the judgment. That is the
reason usually advanced by the courts which refuse to permit a
recovery in such cases, following McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hos-
pital, 120 Mass. 432 (decided in 1876), which was the first re-
ported case in this country on this subject. The McDonald case
followed the case of Feoffees of Heriot Hospital v. Rees (de-
cided in 1846), and reported in 12 Clark and Fin. 507. The court
there held that one could not recover from a charitable corpora-
tion for acts of its agents under the respondeat superior doctrine,
on the theory that to so permit would result in the depletion of
trust funds and the diversion of the funds from the purposes for
which their donors gave them. Whether that case is law in Eng-
land to-day is doubtful. That it was not overruled by Mersey
Docks v. Gibbs, L. R. I H. L. 93, is the statement made in Fire
Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. St. 649 (I888), in a decision disaffirming
the contentions upheld in the principal case, but that the Pennsyl-
vania court must have been wrong becomes apparent at once when
we read from the opinion of Justice Blackburn in Foreman v.
Mayor of Canterbury, L. R. 6 Q. B. 214 (1871), wherein he says:
"Holliday v. St. Leonard's follows the Heriot case, in that it de-
cides that a body like a local board of health who were made
surveyors of the highway, were not responsible for negligence of
those who were their servants; but upon looking at the reason of
the decision we consider it overruled in the case of Mersey Docks
v. Gibbs, supra. It is not overruled by name but the principle
upon which that case was decided in the House of Lords does
overrule it, because it was decided that a public body, like a board
of health, are answerable for the acts of their servants, just as if
they were acting as the servants of a private person, and not for a
corporation incorporated for a public purpose. Of course, the
individuals composing the body are not responsible, it is the local
board of health that are responsible, and they would have to pay
the damages out of the funds in their hands as a local board of
health." If this be so, it would appear that the Heriot case is no
longer law in England, the Pennsylvania court's view to the con-
trary notwithstanding.
Whatever be the law in England, undoubtedly it has been held
in some six or seven states in this country that a charitable cor-
YALE LAW JOURNAL
poration is not liable for torts committed by its agents. It has
been so decided in Massachusetts, Kentucky, Maryland, Pennsyl-
vania, Michigan, Virginia, and Connecticut, and as far as these
states, and Rhode Island where the contrary has been held, are
concerned, any discussion of this question must be purely
academic.
The holding of the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors is
refreshing for its frank reasoning, in Hearns v. Waterbury Hos-
pital, 66 Conn. 98 (1895), where it said: "It is, perhaps, im-
material whether we say that the public policy which supports the
doctrine of respondeat superior does not justify such extension
of the rule, or say that the public policy which encourages public
enterprises for charitable purposes requires an exemption from the
operation of the rule based on legal fiction, and which, as
applied to the owners of such enterprises is clearly opposed to
substantial justice. It is enough that a charitable corporation like
the defendant, whatever may be the principle that controls its
liability for corporate neglect in the performance of a corporate
duty, is not liable on grounds of public policy for injuries caused
by personal wrongful neglect in the performance of his duty by a
servant whom it selected with due care, but in such case the ser-
vant is alone responsible for his own wrong. This result is justi-
fied by Hall v. Smith, 2 Bing. i56; Holliday v. St. Leonard, ii
C. B. N. S. 192, and Union Pacific Rail-way Co. v. Artise, 6o Fed.
365, substantially upon the grounds above stated and is reached
for one reason or other (the italics are ours) by the greater num-
ber of courts that have dealt with the particular liability of a
corporation for public or charitable purposes."
The logic of this, i. e., its bold acceptance of the doctrine
"for one reason or other," is better than that in the
McDonald case, supra, where it is held that exemption
exists lest there be a depletion of trust funds, and that
the rule applies only so long as the corporation used due
care in the selection of its servants. The query naturally
suggests itself, that if, as the court suggests, the eleemosynary
corporation is guilty of negligence in selecting its agents, and a
liability subsequently ensues therefrom, then, are not the trust
funds depleted and used for a purpose different from that for
which they were raised? The court did not meet this view at all.
And the next question which properly arises is, how will the
court deal with suits on contract violation by public corporations,
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as far as the argument concerning depletion of trust funds is con-
cerned. We merely suggest this as deserving of thought.
It is submitted that the reasoning in Glavin t. R. I. Gen. Hos-
pital, 12 R. I. 411 (decided in 1879), three years after the Mc-
Donald decision is infinitely better. There the court said: "In
our opinion, the argument will not bear examination. The public
is doubtlessly interested in the maintenance of a great public
charity such as the hospital is, but it also has an interest in oblig-
ing every person and every corporation that undertakes the per-
formance of a duty to perform it carefully, and to that extent
therefore it has an interest against exempting any such person,
and any such corporation from liability for its negligence. The
court cannot undertake to say that the former interest is so
supreme that the latter must be sacrificed to it. Whether it shall
be or not is a question, not for the court, but for the legislature."
This reasoning seems better than that advanced in the Mc-
Donald case. For in that case and the line of cases that follow it,
a liability is admitted to exist if the corporation failed to use
reasonable care in selecting its agenis. If liability exists in such
case, how, we repeat with full deference to the learning of the
courts that have adopted that view, will there be any the less a
depletion of trust funds, if recovery is permitted for negligence,
in such cases as the corporation has been careless in selecting its
agents? And why, admitting for purposes of argument the logic
of such reason, should depletion of trust funds be permissible in
the one event and not in the other? These questions appear un-
answerable.
Moreover, we are unable to see how it will follow that the per-
mitting of suits in these cases will necessarily result in the deple-
tion of trust funds. It is a matter of common knowledge that
such charitable corporations have other sources of revenue than
these trust funds, and no valid reason suggests itself why such
revenues should also be preserved intact from execution on a
judgment.
It is readily admitted that the buildings of such corporations
as are used for public purposes, having been dedicated for such
use, must be exempt from execution and attachment, but that is no
reason why property not so appropriated and dedicated should
not be liable, such property for example as annual state appro-
priations, current receipts from patients, etc.
If the doctrine of respondeat supcrior is to be upheld, and
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after such long acquiesence, it cannot ever be called into question,
we are unable to see how courts can consistently refuse to admit
the liability of public corporations for the delicts of their ser-
vants. For if the doctrine be in force, the reasons for its enforce-
ment in such cases is as strong as in any case of principal and
agent, whatsoever. And the very same reasons are applicable.
Refusing enforcement, a premium is put upon official carelessness
in the case of charitable corporations, which would never be per-
mitted to exist in any other case of similar relation.
It will be interesting to see how the Court of Appeals of New
York will dispose of this troublesome question, whether it will
follow the clear reasoning of the Glavin case, supra, or fall in with
the majority holding, the logic of which is so assailable.
H.F.
STATE PROHIBITION LAWS APPLIED TO UNITED STATE MAILS.
The right of a state to punish for infractions of its criminal
laws by residents of other states, when the mails are used a, a
medium, is upheld by the Court of Appeals of Georgia in Rose v.
State, 62 S. E. 117.
The defendant, a corporation doing business in the state of
Tennessee, mailed to residents of Bartow county, Georgia, circu-
lars advertising their various brands of intoxicating liquors, and
invited orders, enclosing a self-addressed stamped envelope. The
letters were received in due course of mail by the persons to whom
they were addressed in Bartow county, Georgia, and the venue
of the crime alleged is there laid. It is charged that defendant
violated Section 428 of the Penal Code of Georgia, which pro-
hibits the "soliciting, personally or by agent, the sale of spirituous
liquors, where the sale of such liquors is prohibited by law." By
recent legislative enactment the sale of intoxicating liquors is
entirely prohibited within the state of Georgia.
This is a case of first impression to the extent that such a pro-
hibition may be extended to the use of the mails as a medium of
solicitation, but it appears to be supported by analogous decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States.
That a state may prohibit, within its borders, the solicitation of
orders, for intoxicating liquors, cannot be denied. And under the
terms of the Wilson Act (U. S. Comtp. Stat. i9OT, p. 3177), al-
though a state may n6t forbid a resident therein from ordering
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for his own use, intoxicating liquors from another state, it may
forbid the carrying on within its borders, the business of solicita-
tion of orders for intoxicating liquors, although such orders may
only contemplate a contract resulting from final acceptance in
another state. Delametcr v. South Dakota, 205 U. S. 93; Vance
v. Vandcrcook, 170 U. S. 438, distinguished.
In the cases above cited, either the principal or the agent was
personally present within the state. A new difficulty arises when
the offender never comes within the territorial boundaries of the
state. Unquestionably the laws of a state can have no extra-
territorial force. But when one personally out of the state puts in
motion a force which takes effect within the state, he is answer-
able where the evil is done, though his presence was elsewhere.
Bishop's New Criminal Law, Vol. I, Sect. II0. Personal presence
within a state is not necessary to commit crime. Burton v. United
States, 202 U. S. 389. If a person standing in one jurisdiction
fires a gun and kills another who is in a different jurisdiction, the
court of the government where the bullet took effect, alone has
jurisdiction. United States v. Davis, 2 Sumner, 482. In the send-
ing of a telegram, the company is the agent of the sender. Brookes
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 46 S. E. 826. As in this case the
solicitation moved from the defendant to the citizen of Georgia,
it is clear that the mails were the agent of the sender. The de-
fendant's connection with the act, the solicitation by letter, com-
menced when the letter was written and mailed, and did not end
until the letter reached its destination in Bartow county, Georgia,
where it was intended to accomplish its purpose.
Unquestionably, the state may punish for a crime committed
through the mails as a medium, without in any sense infringing
the undoubted right of the national government to control the
mails. Freedom to use the mails does not extend to their use as
a means of committing crime. In re Palliser, 136 U. S. 266, and
cases there cited. In the course of this opinion Justice Gray stated
that while the sender of a letter might be punished at the place
where the letter was mailed, yet it was settled by an overwhelming
weight of authority, that he might be tried and punished at the
place where the letter was received by the person to whom it was
addressed. This seems to be authority for the jurisdiction of the
courts of Bartow county, over the offense.
In the recent case of United States v. Thayer, 209 U. S. 39,
it was ruled that it is possible to solicit by letter as well as in
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person. The solicitation was not accomplished until the letter was
received, and had the letter been lost in the mails the crime could
never have been committed. In this case the act was not comi-
pleted until the letter had been received and read in the state of
Georgia.
It cannot be doubted that the shipments of liquor by a person
in one state to a resident of another state, constitutes interstate
commerce. And as a rule the negotiations in one state of sales
of goods, which are in another state, for the purpose of their in-
troduction into the former state, also is a portion of interstate
commerce. 17 Am. and Eng. Encyc of Law, 2nd ed., 65. The
case at bar comes dangerously close to that line of demarcation
that separates the powers of a sovereign state to control its intra-
state police regulations, and the protection which the Constitution
of the United States throws around interstate commerce. But
since the passage of the Wilson Act, all negotiations that lead up
to a transaction in intoxicating liquors are not interstate com-
merce, though the liquor and the person selling it are in a different
state from the purchaser. See Delameter v. United States, supra.
As by the terms of the Wilson Act, liquors lose their inter-
state character as soon as they reach the borders of a state, the
decisions of the courts in insurance cases become pertinent. In.
Massachusetts 7,. Nutting, 175 Mass. i56, confirmed in 183 U. S.
553, it was held that while the legislature could not impair the
freedom of its citizens in their election with whom they would
contract, it could prevent the foreign insurer from sheltering
himself under that protection to solicit contracts which otherwise
the citizens might not have thought of making. The law cannot
impair the freedom of the citizen of Georgia, guaranteed him by
the Constitution of the United States, to order liquor from other
states for his private consumption, but the state can prohibit
others from sheltering themselves under this freedom for the
purpose of soliciting his orders, when such solicitation is a crime.
Neither does this decision take away from the citizens of Ten-
nessee any of the rights or privileges granted the citizens of
Georgia, for the right of soliciting orders is denied in both cases.
MISCONDUC'I OF JURORS.
Between the natural dislike of the average citizen of serving
on a jury and the vigilance of astute counsel in detecting any
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short-coming on the part of the juror, it is not surprising that
occasionally we find reports of alleged misconduct. The most
recent illustration is in Continental Casualty Co. v. Scruple, 112
S. W. (Ky.) 1122. During the trial of the action, one of the
jurors closed his eyes and in an effort to have the judgment
reversed, affidavits were made by the counsel for the appellant
that the juror was actually asleep. The counsel for the appellee
and the juryman, both made affidavits that the latter was not
asleep but merely listening with his eyes closed. The court re-
fused to reverse the judgment.
There seems to be no similar case reported, but the cases of
alleged misbehavior by jurors are numerous. Misconduct in the
jury box is rare, and is usually occasioned by the efforts of mem-
bers of the jury to direct counsel in their conduct of the case.
Thus, in Chicago City Railway Co. v. Brecher, 112 Ill. App. io6,
during the trial of the case one of the jurors interrupted to in-
form the court that he would not believe certain evidence already
admitted, and that it was useless for the court to receive the same.
Such remarks were clearly reprehensible, as a juror should not
form a final conclusion until all the evidence has been received.
There are but few early cases relating to the misconduct of jurors,
probably because juries were formerly subject to a more rigid
guardianship than at the present time. Two hundred years ago,
Justice Treby in the trial of one Peter Cook, at the Old Bailey,
said to the impanelled jury: "If any man in this panel have any
particular displeasure to the prisoner or be indifferent, or have
declared himself so, I do admonish and desire him to discover so
much in general, for it is not-fit nor for the honor of the King's
Justice that such a man should serve on the jury." In a case
which arose in Connecticut in 1789, a juror was charged with
having conversation with strangers before the verdict was ren-
dered. In its opinion, the court declared that such conduct was
a violation of his oath, and if such a practice were permitted, the
purity of trials by jury would be perverted and corrupted. Dana
v. Roberts, i Root (Conn.) 134. See also Bow v. Parsons, i
Root (Conn.) 429 (1792).
The devices to which jurymen will resort in order to be released
from their duties, oftentimes border upon the ridiculous. In White
v. Martin, 3 Ill. 69, the court at the conclusion of its charge,
directed the jury to return a sealed verdict and then disperse.
After the jury had been out several hours, they had the result of'
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their deliberations set forth in a writing, and this was placed in a
sealed envelope. When the envelope was opened the following
day the writing was found to contain the words: "Can't agree."
Needless to say the action of the jury was severely condemned by
the court, and characterized as a gross violation of the duties of
their office. Although the foregoing incident occurred in 1839,
the spirit which moved the jury to adopt such a plan still seems to
survive, for a similar affair happened in New York City last
December. At the time of writing, it appears probable that the
erring jurors will be committed to jail for a short period to ex-
piate their offence. The courts have always been very strict in
forbidding communication with a jury while their verdict is pend-
ing. There is an Illinois case holding that the nature of the con-
versation had with the jury is immaterial. Martin v. Morlock, 32
Ill. 485. But in this case the jury had attempted to trick the
court immediately after a conversation with one of the parties,
so that fact probably influenced the decision. But at the present
day, the mere fact that communication has been had with a juror,
is not of itself sufficient ground for setting aside the verdict. The
subject of the conversation may be shown, and if its character is
such that it would probably not influence the decision of-the jury,
a new trial will not be allowed. In Fleischman v. Samuel, 18
App. Div. (N. Y.) 97, the foreman of the jury was seen in con-
versation with the plaintiff. The juryman claimed he said to the
plaintiff: "It is a long sit to sit here all day.' The plaintiff
denied having had any conversation whatsoever. The court sus-
tained the verdict for the plaintiff, saying that the conversation
was only an inadvertent indiscretion and could have no effect
upon the conclusion reached.
A verdict will be set aside if a juror ask a stranger concerning
public sentiment. Churchill v. Emerick, 56 Mich. 536. A pre-
mature disclosure of a verdict to counsel for one of the parties
is not a reason for reversal. But such a proceeding will be care-
fully scrutinized, and if there is the least reason to infer that the
defeated party has suffered damage because of such a disclosure,
the verdict will be set aside. Ingersoll v. Truebody, 40 Cal. 603.
The question of keeping newspaper notices referring to the
matter at issue from the attention of the jury, has always been a
troublesome one for both court and counsel. Unless the jury is
completely isolated, it is practically impossible to prevent the mem-
bers reading newspaper accounts of the trial, though the latter
COMMENTS
be even of the smallest importance. The Federal courts have
adopted a rule which may seem a little severe, but as it applies to
only one phase of this topic its application is seldom required. In
a case being tried where the jury separated each night, certain
apparently "inspired" articles appeared in the leading local papers
of such a nature that they would probably influence the minds of
those reading them. The court set aside the verdict saying that it
would presume the jury saw and read these articles. Meyer v. Cad-
walder, 49 Fed. Rep. 32. The wisdom of such a rule is doubtful,
however, unless there is very clear proof that the publication of
the articles was instigated by one of the parties. If such a rule
is carried out to its logical consequences, we might have the
curious spectacle of one verdict being set aside, because a party to
the action procured the publication of matter likely to influence
the minds of the jurors, and then on a retrial of the same case, if
the newspaper publishes the identical matter again but of its own
motion, the verdict will be sustained. While it is undoubtedly
desirable to have jurors refrain from reading newspaper com-
ments on the trial, yet if they do so, in the absence of express
directions to the contrary, it can hardly be said that they are
guilty of misconduct.
Besides being guilty of contempt in misconducting himself, a
juror may be subject to a criminal prosecution for acts that may
seem but of very small importance to the layman, and which,
indeed, are far from being criminal per se. In the early part
of the last century, we find a case holding a juryman guilty of a
misdemeanor who asked a stranger what he thought of the evi-
dence. Barlow v. State, 2 Blach (Ind.) 114. But to-day, when
the act is occasioned through ignorance or want of judgment
rather than any wilful intent to do wrong, it is probable that a
juror would not be punished as having committed a criminal act.
